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Evaluating the prevalence of informal payments for health services in 
Southeast Europe: an institutional approach 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing inspiration from institutional theory, the aim of this paper is to explain the prevalence 
of informal payments for health services in Southeast Europe as resulting from formal 
institutional failures which lead to an asymmetry between the laws and regulations (formal 
institutions) and the unwritten rules (informal institutions), making informal payments 
acceptable. Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of the propensity to make informal 
payments for health services in Southeast Europe, a strong association is found between the 
degree to which formal and informal institutions are unaligned, and the prevalence of informal 
payments. The relationship between informal payments and formal institutional imperfections 
is then explored to identify the structural conditions which lead to this institutional asymmetry 
in Southeast Europe, and thus the propensity to make informal payments. The paper concludes 
by exploring the theoretical and policy implications. 
 
Keywords: informal payments, Southeast Europe, health services, institutional theory, 
institutional asymmetry. 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
It is now widely recognised that in many countries, those using health services make informal 
payments to healthcare professionals in order to obtain either better treatment (Atanasova, 
Pavlova, and Groot 2015; Baji et al. 2011; Balabanova and McKee 2002; Habibov 2016; 
Mæstad and Mwisongo 2011; Liaropoulos et al. 2008; Vian et al. 2006), due to their fear of 
being denied treatment (Tahiri et al. 2013; Vian et al. 2006), to receive an additional service 
(Ensor 2004), because the µdoctor demanded payment¶ (Liaropoulos et al. 2008), because it is 
the norm to give a gift to express gratitude (Fomenko and Stepurko 2012; Liaropoulos et al. 
2008; Vian et al. 2006) or just µbecause everybody does it¶ (Liaropoulos et al. 2008). Making 
informal payments for health services is not some minority practice. Stepurko et al. (2013), for 
example, find that some 35-60% of patients make informal payments in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. As such, explaining and tackling this systemic 
problem is necessary if healthcare systems are to be developed which are not based on bribes 
and corruption, and which provides more equal access (Delcheva, Balabanova, and McKee 
1997; Gaal and McKee 2005; Lewis 2002). 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate a new way of explaining informal payments for 
health services in Southeast Europe. Until now, institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder 2008; 
North 1990) has been used in health services research to evaluate the adoption of health 
information technology (Fareed et al. 2015; Nilashi et al. 2016; Sherer 2010), healthcare 
reform (Contandriopoulos and Brousselle 2010), patient-centred preventative care (Ledderer 
2010) and healthcare expenditure (Burnett et al. 2016). In this paper, and drawing inspiration 
from the application of institutional theory to the study of the wider informal economy (Author 
2016; Author 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a, 2016b), we here for the first time seek to evaluate 
the validity of explaining informal payments to patients in Southeast Europe through the lens 
of institutional theory.  
From an institutionalist perspective, informal payments can be explained in two ways. 
Firstly, informal payments can be explained to result from formal institutional failures in 
healthcare services. Indeed, previous literature has identified a number of systemic factors that 
lead to informal payments, including legal-ethical, socio-cultural (i.e., the social custom of 
expressing gratitude through informal payments), governance failures (e.g. poor 
accountability) and economic (e.g. underfunding in the face of growing healthcare needs) 
conditions (Cohen 2012; Gaal and McKee 2005; Gaal and McKee 2004; Tambor et al. 2013).  
Secondly, however, and reflecting the advances in institutional theory when studying 
the wider informal economy (Author 2015a, 2015b), institutions FDQEHVHHQDVµthe rules of the 
game¶ prescribing what is socially acceptable, and therefore constraining and encouraging 
various behaviours (North 1990). In every society, moreover, there are both formal institutions 
(i.e., codified laws and regulations) which prescribe the legal rules of the game, and informal 
institutions which describe the µsocially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels¶+HOPNHDQG/HYLWVN\
2004, 727). Viewed through this institutional lens, informal payments therefore emerge when 
formal institutional failures lead to a lack of alignment between the formal rules of the game 
and the norms, practices and values of the informal institutions. Indeed, the greater is the 
institutional asymmetry, the higher is the prevalence of informal payments. Until now, neither 
the formal institutional imperfections nor the institutional asymmetry thesis have been 
evaluated as explanations for informal payments by patients in Southeast Europe. This paper, 
therefore, begins to fill that gap.  
To start to evaluate these institutionalist explanations, section 2 briefly reviews the 
previous literature on informal payments and how institutional theory can be used to explain 
this practice. The outcome will be a set of hypotheses regarding the association between 
informal payments and the level of asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, and 
the association between informal payments and various formal institutional failures. To start to 
test these hypotheses, section 3 then reports the dataset used, namely a 2013 Eurobarometer 
survey involving more than 5,000 face-to-face interviews with patients in six countries in 
Southeast Europe, along with the analytical methods employed (logistic regression). The 
fourth section then reports the results on the relationship between informal payments and 
institutional asymmetry, as well as the association between such payments and various 
systemic conditions. The final section then draws conclusions on the theoretical and policy 
implications. 
At the outset, however, informal payments must be defined. Reflecting the emergent 
consensus, informal payments refer to direct contributions in cash or in kind, made in addition 
to any contribution determined by the terms of entitlement, by patients or others acting on their 
behalf, to health care providers for services to which the patients are entitled (Chereches et al. 
2013; Gaal, Jakab, and Shishkin 2011). Although there is a string consensus over how to define 
informal payments, the same cannot be said about the phrases used to refer to this phenomenon, 
which is also termed µXQGHU-the-WDEOH¶SD\PHQWV (Delcheva, Balabanova, and McKee 1997), 
µunder-the-counter¶ payments (Balabanova and McKee 2002; Delcheva Balabanova, and 
McKee 1997) DQGµunofficial¶ payments (Ensor 2004). 
 
Evaluating informal payments for health services: an institutional approach 
 
Over the past decade or so, there has been an emergent literature which has shown how, 
especially in developing and transition countries, it is common when receiving healthcare 
services for patients to make additional informal payments to the medical staff apart from the 
official fees for healthcare services received. This has been identified not only in a 
cross-national study of 35 European countries (Tambor et al. 2013), but also in studies 
conducted in individual Southeast European countries, such as Bulgaria (Atanasova, Pavlova, 
and Groot 2015; Balabanova and McKee 2002; Delcheva, Balabanova, and McKee 1997; 
Pavlova, Groot, and van Merode 2002; Rechel et al. 2011) and Greece (Kaitelidou et al. 2013; 
Liaropoulos et al. 2008). Indeed, examining this literature, what becomes quickly apparent is 
that this is far from being a minority rarely used practice in Southeast Europe. Estimates 
suggest that the proportion of patients making informal payments is 43% in Bulgaria 
(Delcheva, Balabanova, and McKee 1997) and 36% in Greece (Liaropoulos et al. 2008). 
To explain the prevalence of informal payments for healthcare services in Southeast 
Europe, inspiration is here drawn from institutional theory (North 1990). Following advances 
in the use of institutional theory to explain the wider informal economy, it is here argued that 
informal payments can be viewed as socially constructed behaviour, and institutions as µthe 
rules of the game¶ which prescribe, monitor, enforce, and support what is socially acceptable 
(Baumol and Blinder 2008; North 1990; Webb et al. 1999). This socially constructed behaviour 
of making informal payments for healthcare services is therefore shaped by institutional 
environments. According to Scott (2008), such institutional environments comprise the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars. The regulatory pillar is comprised of the 
formal rules, regulations and associated sanctions that promote certain behaviours and restrict 
others (e.g. making informal payments to medical staff). The normative pillar refers to wider 
norms, values and beliefs present in a society about what constitutes an acceptable behaviour 
(socially legitimate behaviour). As such, some may consider that it is acceptable to give a gift 
to a physician to express gratitude. The cultural-cognitive pillar relates to how certain 
behaviours become the norm based on shared understandings and common beliefs. Indeed, one 
has only to consider that it is the norm to give a gift to a physician to express gratitude 
(Fomenko and Stepurko 2012; Liaropoulos et al. 2008; Vian et al. 2006) DQGµeverybody does 
LW¶/LDURSRXORVHWDO Informal payments by patients are therefore often referred to as 
µFXOWXUDOly¶ embedded, the µFXOWXUH RI JLIWV¶ being rooted in long-standing traditions, 
particularly in post-socialist societies. The regulative pillar refers to formal institutions, while 
the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars refer to informal institutions. 
All societies have both formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and regulations) that set 
out the legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions which are the µsocially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels¶ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). Informal payments are viewed as an 
endeavour which are outside of formal institutional prescriptions but within the norms, values, 
and beliefs of informal institutions. Such payments thus prevail when there is asymmetry 
between the codified laws and regulations (formal institutions) and the socially shared 
unwritten rules (informal institutions). Indeed, the greater is the institutional asymmetry, the 
higher is the prevalence of informal payments. Here therefore, and to evaluate whether the 
likelihood of making informal payments for healthcare services is associated with the degree of 
asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, the following hypothesis can be 
proposed: 
 
Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H1): the commonality of informal payments is 
greater in populations with greater asymmetry between their formal and informal 
institutions. 
 
Indeed, examining who is more likely to make informal payments for healthcare services, 
previous studies conducted across the world display that women are more likely to do so (Baji 
et al. 2012; Balabanova and McKee 2002; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012; Riklikiene, Jarasiunaite, 
and Starkiene 2014; Author 2016), as are younger persons (Arsenijevic, Pavlova, and Groot 
2015; Balabanova and McKee 2002; Danyliv et al. 2015; Tomini and Maarse 2011; Tomini, 
Groot, and Pavlova 2012a; Stepurko et al. 2015b), those who spent more years in education 
(Arsenijevic, Pavlova, and Groot 2015; Baji et al. 2012; Balabanova and McKee 2002; 
Kaitelidou et al. 2013; Riklikiene, Jarasiunaite, and Starkiene 2014; Stepurko et al. 2015b; 
Tomini, Groot, and Pavlova 2012a), those in employment (Kaitelidou et al. 2013), those 
married (Tomini, Groot, and Pavlova 2012a), living in smaller households (Baji et al. 2012; 
Tomini, Groot, and Pavlova 2012a; Tomini, Groot, and Pavlova 2012b), rural dwellers 
(Danyliv et al. 2015; Tomini and Groot 2013; Tomini and Maarse 2011), and lower income 
populations (Kankeu and Ventelou 2016; Szende and Culyer 2006; Tengilimoglu et al. 2015; 
Tomini and Groot 2013). Here, therefore, by testing the institutional asymmetry hypothesis, it 
can be revealed whether these populations are more likely to make informal payments and 
whether this is associated with them having a higher institutional asymmetry. 
 Institutional asymmetry, nevertheless, can be viewed as resulting from formal 
institutional imperfections (Webb et al. 2009). The ways in which, and whether, these formal 
institutional failures produce institutional asymmetry is a complex process that will vary in 
different institutional environments. For instance, developing economies are so defined 
SUHFLVHO\ EHFDXVH WKH\ KDYH µZHDN¶ DQG XQGHU-developed formal institutions. They usually 
suffer from a lack of modernisation of public services and state authorities, a lack and 
misallocation of resources, widespread corruption practices and so forth. With these formal 
institutional failings, it is perhaps unsurprising that citizens draw upon existing socially shared 
norms, values and beliefs instead of relying on formal laws and regulations (Author, 2017). As 
such, the structural conditions characterising formal institutions, that previous literature has 
identified as associated with the greater prevalence of informal payments, need to be evaluated 
as determinants of the level of institutional asymmetry. Reviewing the literature on the 
systemic factors that lead to informal payments by patients (e.g. economic conditions, 
governance failures), we here group formal institutional imperfections into two categories. 
Firstly, formal institutional voids, such as lower expenditures on healthcare (Balabanova and 
McKee 2002) and inefficient resource allocation which results in a low range and reach of 
healthcare services (Baji et al. 2013; Gaal and McKee 2004; Gaal, Evetovits, and McKee 2006; 
Kutzin, Jakab, and Cashin 2010; Lewis 2002; Tambor et al. 2013; Tomini and Groot 2013), and 
secondly, formal institutional inefficiencies, such as the poor quality of government and lower 
performing healthcare systems (Cohen 2012; Fotaki 2009; Gaal and McKee 2004; Lewis 2002; 
Rechel et al. 2011; Stepurko et al. 2015a; Tambor et al. 2013; Tomini and Groot 2013). To test 
whether these formal institutional voids and inefficiencies are associated with greater levels of 
informal payment, the following hypotheses can be thus evaluated:     
 
Formal institutional failures hypothesis (H2): the commonality of informal payments is 
higher in health systems with greater formal institutional imperfections. 
 
Formal institutional voids (H2A): the commonality of informal payments is greater in 
health systems with greater formal institutional voids. 
Lack of financial resources (H2A1): the commonality of informal payments is 
greater in health systems with lower expenditures on health. 
Lack of a basic health service (H2A2): the commonality of informal payments is 
greater in health systems with a lower range and reach of service provision. 
 
Formal institutional inefficiencies (H2B): the commonality of informal payments is 
greater in countries with greater formal institutional inefficiencies. 
Quality of government (H2B1): the commonality of informal payments is greater in 
countries with a lower quality of government. 
Health system performance (H2B2): the commonality of informal payments is 
greater in health systems with higher death rates. 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between informal payments and the degree of institutional 
asymmetry, along with the explanations relating to formal institutional imperfections, we here 
XVH 6SHFLDO (XUREDURPHWHU 1R  µ&RUUXSWLRQ¶ FRQGXFWHG DV SDUt of wave 79.1 of the 
Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2014a). This survey involved over 5,000 
face-to-face interviews conducted in February and March 2013 across six countries in 
Southeast Europe (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Greece, Romania and Slovenia), of which 3,446 
reported that they had visited a public healthcare practitioner or institution in the past 12 
months. In this paper, only those respondents who used healthcare services have been 
analysed, for which data on each and every analysed variable is available.  
The interviews for this Eurobarometer survey were carried out in the national language 
with adults aged 15 years and older, using a common questionnaire and a multi-stage random 
(probability) sampling methodology to ensure that on the issues of gender, age, region and 
locality size, each country as well as each level of sample was representative in proportion to its 
population size (see Eurobarometer Technical Notes for details; European Commission, 
2014b). For the univariate analysis, we have therefore used the sample weighting scheme as 
recommended in the broader literature (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2013; Winship and 
Radbill 1994) as well as the Eurobarometer methodology (European Commission 2014b). 
Regarding the multivariate analysis, however, there is debate regarding whether a weighting 
scheme should be used or not (Pfefferman 1994; Sharon and Liu 1994; Solon, Haider, and 
Wooldridge 2013). Given that the majority view in this literature and previous studies on the 
wider informal economy (e.g. Author 2016) is that the weighting scheme should not be used for 
the multivariate analysis, we decided not to do so. 
 The dependent variable is whether patients made extra informal payments for 
healthcare services. This is based on an analysis of responses WR WKHTXHVWLRQ µ$SDUW IURP
official fees did you have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift to a nurse or a doctor, or 
PDNHDGRQDWLRQWRWKHKRVSLWDO"¶ To analyse H1 regarding whether informal payments are 
associated with the degree of institutional asymmetry, an Institutional Asymmetry Index for 
each respondent has been constructed. Participants were asked to rate on a 3-point Likert scale 
(where 1 means always acceptable and 3 means never acceptable) the acceptability of three 
behaviours, namely: a) to give money, b) to give a gift or c) to do a favour, in order to get 
something from the public administration or a public service. The index has been calculated 
here using the mean score across these three attitudinal questions. A lower index value 
LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHQRUPVYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIVRIDVRFLHW\¶VLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHnot aligned 
with the formal institutions (i.e., WKHµOHJDOUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶. The lower the index value, the 
higher is the institutional asymmetry. 
To analyse the relationship between informal payments and formal institutional 
imperfections (H2), meanwhile, and similar to previous studies on informal payments, the 
relationship between informal payments and various country-level structural conditions are 
evaluated (e.g. Belli, Shahriari, and Gotzadze 2004; Bloom, Han, and Li 2001; Cohen 2012), 
whilst holding constant the Institutional Asymmetry Index and a range of individual-level 
variables (gender, age, household composition, social class, employment status, difficulties 
paying bills, and type of community). Similar individual-level socio-demographic, 
socio-economic and spatial characteristics have been used in previous studies when evaluating 
informal payments (Baji et al. 2013; Author 2016). 
 To evaluate the lack of financial resources hypothesis (H2A1), we used the level of total 
expenditure on health expressed as a percentage of GDP (World Bank 2013) and to evaluate 
the lack of a basic health service hypothesis (H2A2) we used the range and reach of health 
services provided in a country ± a sub-component of the European Health Consumer Index, 
2013 (Health Consumer Powerhouse 2013). To evaluate the relationship between informal 
patient payments and governance (H2B1) and health system performance (H2B2), the analysed 
indicators are: the crude death rate per 1000 people (World Bank 2013) and the European 
Quality of Government Index respectively, the latter including both perceptions and 
experiences with public sector services, and the index is standardised with a mean of zero, with 
higher scores implying a higher quality of government (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2015). 
To evaluate our hypotheses, after using a descriptive analysis, a logistic regression 
analysis is conducted. Given the significant correlation between death rates and the European 
Quality of Government Index (see Table A2 in Appendix), the variable investigating death 
rates is added separately to the individual-level variables (i.e., the Institutional Asymmetry 
Index and the socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial control variables) to evaluate 
whether it is significantly associated with the commonality of informal payments. Below, the 
findings are reported. 
 
Findings 
 
Of the 5,548 face-to-face interviews conducted in these six Southeast European countries, 
namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Greece, Romania and Slovenia, 3,446 respondents had 
visited a public healthcare practitioner or institution in the 12 months prior to the interview, of 
whom 16% had made informal payments for receipt of a public healthcare service. As such, in 
the year prior to the survey, some one in 6 citizens in Southeast Europe visiting a public 
healthcare institution made informal payments. 
Not all countries and not all population groups, nevertheless, display the same 
propensity to make informal payments for healthcare services. Table 1 reveals that the share of 
patients reporting informal payments is highest in Romania (30%), Greece (11%) and Bulgaria 
(8%) and lowest in Croatia (3%), Slovenia (3%) and Cyprus (2%). Reporting a representative 
study carried out in 2010, Stepurko et al. (2015b) found a similarly high prevalence of informal 
payments by patients in the 12 months prior to the survey in Romania (35%) and Bulgaria 
(12%). However, patients in Romania and Bulgaria are more likely to give informal payments 
between 1 and 50 euros (54% and 45% respectively), while patients in Croatia and Greece are 
more likely to give informal payments exceeding 200 euros (76% and 64% respectively).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Not only is the practice of making informal payments concentrated in certain countries, it is 
also more prevalent in some population groups rather than others. Examining the groups more 
likely to make informal payments, the finding is that patients aged 25-39 years are more likely 
to give extra payments or valuable gifts for healthcare services than older patients over 55 years 
old (20% compared with 13%). Patients in single-person households are more likely than those 
living with other persons to make informal payments (20% compared with 15%) and employed 
patients more likely than unemployed patients to make informal payments (19% compared 
with 13%). So too are patients who face difficulties in paying their bills more likely to make 
informal payments than those who do not have such difficulties. These descriptive statistics are 
in line with previous studies investigating the relationship between informal payments by 
patients and age (e.g. Arsenijevic, Pavlova, and Groot 2015; Balabanova and McKee 2002; 
Danyliv et al. 2015; Stepurko et al. 2015b; Tomini and Maarse 2011), household size (e.g. Baji 
et al. 2012; Tomini, Groot, and Pavlova 2012a) or employment status (e.g. Kaitelidou et al. 
2013). However, unlike previous studies which revealed an association between informal 
payments and gender (e.g. Stepurko et al. 2015b; Baji et al. 2012; Balabanova and McKee 
2002; Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012), the results in Table 1 seem to not support such an 
association for this group of countries in Southeast Europe. Nevertheless, these findings are 
further tested using logistic regressions in Table 2.    
To evaluate whether these cross-national and population group variations in informal 
payments are related with the level of institutional asymmetry, the final columns of Table 1 
report the variations in the Institutional Asymmetry Index. This reveals that the Institutional 
Asymmetry Index is lower (and thus institutional asymmetry is greater) for patients making 
informal payments (2.40) compared with patients not making informal payments (2.70). The 
same trend can be identified in the various countries and population groups. Indeed, countries 
in Southeast Europe where informal payments are more common report higher levels of 
institutional asymmetry between those making informal payments than those not doing so: 
2.39 and 2.73 in Romania, and 2.36 and 2.62 in Greece. Similarly, this is again the case in 
Croatia with a value of 2.33 for patients making informal payments and 2.67 for patients not 
making informal payments. Lower levels of institutional asymmetry, meanwhile, exist in 
Slovenia among those making informal payments than among those not making such 
payments (2.83 and 2.84). Analysing these descriptive statistics therefore, the tentative finding 
is that, although ubiquitous across all countries and population groups, informal payments are 
more common in populations where there is a higher level of asymmetry between formal and 
informal institutions.  
To determine firstly, whether the association between informal payments and 
institutional asymmetry (H1) is significant when other control variables are taken into account 
and held constant, and secondly, to investigate the country-level formal institutional 
imperfections (H2) associated with informal payments, Table 2 reports the results of a logistic 
regression. The first stage of the analysis involves solely individual-level characteristics and 
the second stage includes both individual- and country-level variables (see Table A1 in 
Appendix for details of the variables).   
    
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The first row in Models 1-4 in Table 2 reveals that greater informal payments is strongly 
associated with higher levels of institutional asymmetry (i.e., a low Institutional Asymmetry 
Index) across all models, whether only individual-level variables are analysed, or country-level 
structural conditions are added (confirming H1). Moreover, Model 1 identifies that patients in 
single-person households are more likely to make informal payments, and that informal 
payments are significantly less prevalent among those who have no difficulties in paying their 
bills. Similar results were obtained by Stepurko et al. (2015b) when examining informal 
payments in Hungary, Lithuania and Romania. Adding spatial variables in Model 2, 
meanwhile, these results remain the same and in addition, it reveals that patients in Romania, 
Greece and Bulgaria are significantly more likely to make informal payments. However, no 
significant correlation with informal payments is found with respect to gender, age, social 
class, employment status and the type of the community where the patient lives in either model, 
as was previously the case in studies conducted by Baji et al. (2012), Kaitelidou et al. (2013), 
Mokhtari and Ashtari (2012), Riklikiene, Jarasiunaite and Starkiene (2014) or Stepurko et al. 
(2015b).  
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 meanwhile, test the formal institutional imperfections 
hypothesis (H2) regarding the structural conditions that explain the commonality of informal 
payments. Model 3 reveals that informal payments are more common in countries with lower 
levels of health expenditure in GDP (confirming H2A1). It also reveals that informal payments 
are more common in countries in health systems with a low range and reach of services 
provision (confirming H2A2). Turning to the formal institutional inefficiencies, meanwhile, 
Model 3 reveals strong evidence that informal payments are more common in countries with 
lower qualities of government (confirming H2B1) and Model 4 provides strong evidence that 
informal payments are more common in countries with high death rates (confirming H2B2). 
These results are consistent with previous evidence that informal payments by patients are 
more prevalent in countries with a lower share of public health expenditure, lower quality of 
healthcare services and lower government effectiveness (Cohen 2012; Gaal and McKee 2005; 
Gaal and McKee 2004; Tambor et al. 2013). 
To better analyse the relationship between informal payments, institutional asymmetry 
and formal institutional imperfections, and to help interpret the findings, Figures 1 and 2 
SUHVHQW WKHSUHGLFWHGSUREDELOLWLHVRID µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶SDWLHQW LQ Southeast Europe making 
informal payments by their level of institutional asymmetry (Figure 1, Figure 2) and various 
country-level structural conditions (Figure 2). By taking the mean and modal values of other 
independent variables, the representative patient in Southeast Europe is here a 55+ years-old 
women in the working class of the society, not working, living in a household with two persons 
or more, located in a large town, who is having difficulties in paying the household bills and 
lives in Romania or in a country with average values of the analysed macro-level indicators. As 
graphically displayed in Figure 1A, as institutional asymmetry decreases, the predicted odds of 
this representative patient making informal payments becomes smaller. As Figure 1B shows, 
this is the case in all six Southeast European countries analysed; as institutional asymmetry 
decreases, the predicted odds of making informal payments becomes smaller. 
Moreover, analysing Figure 2.A-D, the finding is that as institutional asymmetry 
decreases and country-level structural conditions improve, the predicted odds of the 
representative patient making informal payments in Southeast Europe becomes smaller. As 
these graphs clearly and graphically display, patients living in countries with higher 
expenditure levels on health (Figure 2A), a wider range and reach of health service provision 
(Figure 2B), higher qualities of government (Figure 2C), and low death rates (Figure 2D) have 
lower predicted odds of making informal payments. The consequence is that it can be 
tentatively asserted that formal institutional failings appear to engender greater institutional 
asymmetry and consequently higher predicted odds of making informal payments. 
 
Discussion  
 
This paper has advanced a new way of explaining the informal payments in the healthcare 
sector in Southeast Europe. Drawing upon institutional theory, it has displayed that, when 
formal and informal institutions are not aligned, informal practices emerge embedded in 
unwritten socially shared rules but which do not adhere to the legal rules. The higher is the 
asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, the greater is the commonality of such 
informal practices. Using logistic regression analysis, this has been shown to be the case when 
solely the individual-level variables are analysed and also when country level variables (i.e. 
structural conditions related with formal institutional imperfections) are analysed along with 
the individual-level ones. In consequence, it can be tentatively asserted that formal institutional 
failings result in an asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions, thus making the 
use of informal payments in healthcare services more common.   
To reduce informal payments therefore, it will be necessary to reduce this institutional 
asymmetry. This requires changes in not only the norms, practices and beliefs that constitute 
the informal institutions but also in the formal institutions by tackling the formal institutional 
imperfections that lead to institutional asymmetry and thus informal payments. 
To alter the informal institutions, three policy initiatives can be pursued in Southeast 
Europe. Firstly, advertising campaigns (targeting the groups identified above with high levels 
of institutional asymmetry) can be pursued, which for example inform patients of the costs and 
risks of making informal payments to healthcare professionals. Secondly, normative appeals to 
both patients and healthcare professionals can be used to curb the tendency to pay for, and ask 
for, informal payments. Indeed, as shown in previous studies, combining anticorruption 
measures with normative appeals have been a potent combination for tackling informal 
payments in some post-socialist countries (Danyliv et al. 2015; Stepurko et al. 2013). And third 
and finally, education is required to inform citizens and patients about the relationship between 
paying taxes and public services, so as to display that the benefit of paying taxes is that more 
money is available to improve public services such as healthcare (e.g., so that higher salaries 
can be paid). If such educational campaigns were successful, then wages could perhaps rise in 
the healthcare services and healthcare professionals would no longer feel the need to request 
informal payments and patients no longer feel the need to make such informal payments.  
Seeking to change the norms, values and beliefs of citizens, however, will not alone 
reduce the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions and thus the commonality of 
informal payments. Institutional asymmetry results from the existence of formal institutional 
imperfections and these need addressing if informal payments are to be reduced. As models 3 
and 4 in Table 2 reveal, informal payments are more common in systems with low expenditure 
on health and a lower range and reach of services provision. They are also more common in 
systems with a lower quality of government and higher death rates. It will be also necessary to 
address these structural conditions, therefore, if institutional asymmetry and thus the 
commonality of informal payments is to be reduced.  
Nevertheless, given the sensitive nature of informal payments, the reported percentages 
in the analysis might be underestimated. Indeed, some respondents might not have answered 
honestly when asked whether they gave an extra payment or a valuable gift to healthcare staff, 
apart from official fees. Moreover, this paper has only shown that the asymmetry between 
formal and informal institutions leads to informal payments by patients, and that institutional 
asymmetry is a result of formal institutional imperfections. Future analysis would be useful 
that provide a more in-depth investigation of the norms, values, and beliefs of informal 
institutions which lead to the institutional asymmetry. This deeper analysis of informal 
institutions would require collecting more detailed information regarding the norms and values 
of both patients and healthcare staff which cause institutional asymmetry and thus a high 
prevalence of informal payments for healthcare services.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In sum, this paper has advanced a new way of understanding informal payments in healthcare 
services in Southeast Europe. Whether this institutional lens for explaining and tackling 
informal payments is more widely relevant beyond these six Southeast European countries and 
valid in other Southeast European countries and other global regions now needs to be 
evaluated. If this paper helps to stimulate such evaluations, then one of its intentions will have 
been achieved. If it also encourages governments to recognise how informal payments result 
from such institutional asymmetry and to begin exploring how this can be tackled, then it will 
have achieved its fuller intention. 
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Table 1. Informal payments and institutional asymmetry in Southeast Europe: by spatial and 
socio-economic characteristics 
         
 
Users of 
health 
services 
Informal 
payments 
Informal payment amount  
(per service) 
Institutional 
Asymmetry Index 
1-50¼ 51- 100¼ 
101- 
200¼ >200¼ 
Informal 
payments 
YES 
Informal 
payments  
NO 
 (no.) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) - - 
SOUTH-EAST EUROPE 3,446 16 35 12 23 30 2.40 2.70 
Romania 465 30 54 14 28 4 2.39 2.73 
Greece 608 11 8 0 28 64 2.36 2.62 
Bulgaria 631 8 45 22 11 22 2.45 2.69 
Croatia 702 3 0 24 0 76 2.33 2.67 
Slovenia 737 3 0 0 100 0 2.83 2.84 
Cyprus 303 2 35 0 33 32 2.38 2.77 
Type of community         
Rural area or village 1,279 16 11 16 42 31 2.49 2.70 
Small or middle sized town 896 16 40 25 7 28 2.25 2.71 
Large town 1,271 16 52 4 15 29 2.40 2.69 
Gender         
Male 1,480 15 36 5 19 40 2.34 2.69 
Female 1,966 16 34 17 28 21 2.44 2.70 
Age         
15-24 years 343 14 55 0 11 34 2.38 2.70 
25-39 736 20 31 9 22 38 2.45 2.71 
40-54 842 18 29 16 32 23 2.43 2.70 
55+ 1,529 13 37 15 23 25 2.32 2.68 
Household composition         
One person 601 20 52 3 14 31 2.34 2.71 
Two and more 2,845 15 29 15 27 29 2.42 2.69 
Social class ± self-assessment: 
the working class of society 
        
Yes 1,761 16 36 15 22 27 2.41 2.68 
No 1,631 15 35 8 26 31 2.39 2.72 
DK1/ Refusal 54 9 22 0 22 56 2.07 2.67 
Employment         
Employed 1,363 19 41 12 22 25 2.43 2.69 
Not working 2,083 13 29 12 25 34 2.37 2.70 
Difficulties paying bills         
Yes 2,227 17 31 14 23 32 2.41 2.67 
No 1,219 14 51 3 25 21 2.36 2.75 
Note: 1 DK: Don`t know         
         
  
Table 2. Logistic regressions of the propensity to make informal payments in Southeast 
Europe 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Institutional 
Asymmetry Index -1.322*** (0.121) -1.217*** (0.128) -1.253*** (0.124) -1.291*** (0.121) 
Gender (Male)     
Female 0.055 (0.126) 0.125 (0.134) 0.101 (0.131) 0.053 (0.127) 
Age (15-24 years)     
25-39 0.358 (0.256) 0.173 (0.257) 0.319 (0.254) 0.378 (0.256) 
40-54 0.354 (0.253) 0.244 (0.258) 0.370 (0.254) 0.352 (0.253) 
55+ 0.030 (0.237) -0.130 (0.246) -0.037 (0.241) -0.033 (0.237) 
Household composition (One person)    
Two and more -0.459*** (0.155) -0.361** (0.163) -0.435*** (0.161) -0.444*** (0.155) 
Social class ± self-assessment: the working class of society (Yes)   
No 0.130 (0.132) 0.140 (0.137) 0.221 (0.135) 0.176 (0.135) 
DK1/ Refusal 0.236 (0.464) 0.092 (0.529) -0.013 (0.490) 0.084 (0.476) 
Employment (Employed)    
Not working -0.071 (0.139) -0.055 (0.154) 0.040 (0.148) 0.024 (0.141) 
Difficulties paying bills (Yes)    
No -0.336** (0.141) -0.485*** (0.161) -0.355** (0.152) -0.247* (0.144) 
Type of community (Rural area or village)    
Small or middle sized town -0.015 (0.171) -0.064 (0.165) -0.026 (0.163) 
Large town  0.104 (0.156) 0.090 (0.152) 0.140 (0.147) 
Country (Croatia)     
Greece  1.190*** (0.280)   
Cyprus  -0.089 (0.456)   
Slovenia  0.511 (0.312)   
Bulgaria  1.110*** (0.286)   
Romania  2.793*** (0.258)   
Health expenditure, 
% of GDP (2013) 
 
 -0.435*** (0.060)  
Range and reach of 
services provided2 (2013) 
 
 -0.018*** (0.003)  
European Quality of 
Government Index (2013)   -0.233** (0.111)  
Death rate, crude per 
1000 people (2013)    0.167*** (0.028) 
Constant 1.327*** (0.408) -0.182 (0.501) 5.437*** (0.709) -0.820 (0.537) 
N 3,446 3,446 3,446 3,446 
Pseudo R2 0.0678 0.1859 0.1556 0.0839 
Log likelihood -965.1029 -842.8283 -874.2015 -948.3942 
Ȥ2 143.88 314.21 258.63 184.09 
p>  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes:  
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All coefficients are 
compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
1
 DK: Don`t know; 2 Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index (2013). 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of making informal payments in Southeast Europe, by 
Institutional Asymmetry Level and country 
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of making informal payments in Southeast Europe, by 
Institutional Asymmetry Level and formal institutional imperfections 
  
Appendix 
 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis (n = 3,446) 
    
Variables Definition Mode or mean  Min / Max 
Dependent Variable: 
Informal Payments 
Dummy variable for patient payments in return to 
public healthcare services (apart from official 
fees). 
No informal 
payments (84%) 0 / 1 
Institutional Asymmetry 
Index 
Constructed index of self-reported acceptability 
towards three behaviours: to give money, a gift or 
to do a favour for public services. 
2.64 1 / 3 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the patient. Female (56%) 0 / 1 
Age Patient age in intervals. 55+ years old (40%) 1 / 4 
Household composition Dummy for household size of the patient. Two and more persons (81%) 0 / 1 
Social class: the 
working class of society 
Patients in the working class of society in 
categories (self-assessment). Yes (52%) 1 / 3 
Employment Dummy for the employment status of the patient. Not working (59%) 0 / 1 
Difficulties paying bills Dummy for patient difficulties in paying bills last year. Yes (67%) 0 / 1 
Type of community Type of the community where the patient lives in 
categories. Large town (41%) 1 / 3 
Country Country where the patient lives in categories. Romania (38%) 1 / 6 
Health expenditure, % 
GDP 
Total expenditure on health as a % of Gross 
Domestic Product. 7.43 5.6 / 9.3 
Range and reach of 
services provided 
Sub-discipline in Euro Health Consumer Index, 
evaluating European health systems by Range and 
reach of services provided.   
69.64 50 / 113 
European Quality of 
Government Index 
Perceptions and experiences regarding the quality 
of government. -1.28 
-1.65 / 
0.23 
Death rate, crude per 
1000 people 
The number of deaths occurring during the year, 
per 1,000 inhabitants. 11.90 
6.8 / 
14.4 
    
      
 
  
Table A2. Correlations matrix: institutional imperfections 
    
 Health expenditure, % 
GDP (2013) 
Range and reach of 
services provided (2013) 
European Quality of 
Government Index 
(2013) 
Range and reach of services 
provided (2013) 
0.0661  
*** 
  
European Quality of Government 
Index (2013) 
0.5098 
*** 
0.5038 
*** 
 
Death rate, crude per 1000 people 
(2013) 
-0.3683 
*** 
-0.5526 
*** 
-0.9512 
*** 
Note: Significant at ***p<0.001   
    
 
 
